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ABSTRACT 11 
In this paper we examine the relative importance of an individual‟s subjective 12 
evaluations and social capital on his/her decision to exercise social control (i.e. 13 
confront the offender) on the hypothetical instance of witnessing a PAYT (Pay-As-14 
You-Throw) scheme violation. Our data (N=299) originates from an online 15 
questionnaire filled in by residents of Greece in early summer 2016. Through logistic 16 
regression modeling, we find that the subjective evaluation of the offence and social 17 
capital components have independent and complementary effects on the decision to 18 
exercise social control, over and above the demographic characteristics of the 19 
respondent.  20 
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1. INTRODUCTION 21 
The European Community‟s Thematic Strategy on the Prevention and 22 
Recycling of Waste aspires to “move the EU decisively onto the path of becoming an 23 
economically and environmentally efficient recycling society” (Commission of the 24 
European Communities, 2005, p. 6) while, according to the European Commission 25 
(2011), by 2020 waste should be treated as a resource. In order to reach these goals, 26 
EU member-states had been encouraged to adopt a series of measures and economic 27 
instruments (EIs) that promote waste prevention and enhance re-use, recycling and 28 
waste recovery (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). Numerous EIs, 29 
with different impacts on waste management outcomes, are currently being 30 
implemented by member states, including landfill and incineration taxes and fees as 31 
well as “Pay-as-you-throw” and “Producer responsibility” schemes (European 32 
Commission, 2012).“Pay-as-you-throw” (PAYT) waste management schemes are 33 
implemented in various forms and combinations (Dahlén and Lagerkvist, 2010; 34 
Skumatz, 2008) and, in their various formats, have been gaining pace across the EU. 35 
By 2012, 17 EU member-states had introduced some version of unit-pricing programs 36 
into the management of their municipal waste (European Commission, 2012), while a 37 
recent paper (Seyring et al., 2016) reports that 10 out of the 28 EU countries‟ capitals 38 
implement PAYT schemes. PAYT‟s increased popularity is related to its perceived 39 
ability to address a number of waste management policy challenges and objectives.  40 
According to an extensive review of the existing literature, PAYT schemes reported 41 
strengths include „fair allocation of costs to the users‟, „reducing waste in bins and 42 
bags (15–90%reduction reported)‟, „ensuring transparency of waste management 43 
costs‟, „increasing sorting of recyclables‟, „encouraging home composting‟ as well as 44 
the fact that they „are generally well accepted by the householders‟ (European 45 
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Commission, 2003 cited in Dahlén and Lagerkvist, 2010, p. 24). Yet PAYT is not 46 
without its drawbacks and/or challenges, including „increased costs (both investment 47 
and operational ones)‟,„increased amounts of contaminants in recyclables‟, 48 
„encouraging waste tourism (i.e. waste moved to neighboring communities)‟ as well 49 
as „encouraging illegal waste dumping‟ (ibid.). 50 
While the exact magnitude of the illegal dumping‟s increase following the 51 
adoption of a PAYT scheme is still debated in the literature, its occurrence is a fact 52 
which necessitates the waste management authorities‟ attention. Besides „formal 53 
„measures (i.e. more inspections, closer monitoring, higher fines), (local) authorities 54 
may attempt to dissuade people to free-ride (by illegally dumping their waste) on a 55 
PAYT scheme through ordinary citizens‟ involvement. 56 
Accordingly, in this paper we are interested in examining who is likely to 57 
exercise „social control‟ (i.e. confront the offender) while witnessing an individual 58 
inappropriately using (“free-riding” on) a PAYT scheme. In particular, we are going 59 
to examine and compare the explanatory potential of two different theorizations  60 
suggested in  the  relevant  literature:  one  stressing  the  relevance  of  the  61 
individual‟s subjective appraisal of the „inappropriate‟ behavior; the other 62 
highlighting the importance of the individual‟s social characteristics, and in particular 63 
of his/her social capital. To the best of our knowledge, no existing research has tried 64 
to compare these two explanatory approaches when it comes to exercising social 65 
control in the case of illegal dumping- or, for that matter, in the case of any other anti-66 
social/illegal behavior.   67 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 68 
2.1. PAYT and illegal dumping 69 
The question on whether, and to what extent, adopting a PAYT system for 70 
waste management actually increases illegal dumping in an area is not settled in the 71 
existing literature. Economic modelling had shown that the introduction of a PAYT 72 
charge operates not only as a stimulus for waste reduction (through reuse, recycling, 73 
composting etc.) but also as an incentive for illegal dumping (Choe and Fraser, 1999; 74 
Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995). Yet the available empirical evidence is mixed. Based 75 
on secondary material (such as official statistics, interviews with officials and/or self-76 
reports), a number of studies concluded that the introduction of variable-rate waste-77 
pricing was not followed by a (not always statistically) significant increase of illegal 78 
waste disposal (e.g. Kuo and Perrings, 2010; Miranda et al, 1994; Reschovsky and 79 
Stone, 1994). Yet, Hong (1999), for Korea, and Heller and Vatn (2017), for a 80 
Norwegian municipality, provide reports of substantial increases in illegal dumping – 81 
which, in the Norwegian case, was the main reason for the local authorities‟ decision 82 
to terminate the PAYT system only two years after its introduction (Heller and Vatn, 83 
2017). 84 
On the contrary, research based on primary data indicates that the introduction 85 
of variable waste tariffs leads to substantial increases in illegal dumping. In an early 86 
study  concerning  the  impacts  of  introducing  a  PAYT  scheme  in  Charlottesville, 87 
Virginia,  USA,  Fullerton  and  Kinnaman  (1996)  concluded  that  24  to  43%  of  88 
the observed household-waste reduction could had been due to illegal dumping (pp. 89 
978-980). Later research corroborated this alarming finding. Thus Kim et al. (2008) 90 
found that „a 1% increase in the  unit price of a trash bag led to a 3% increase in the 91 
number of reports of illegal dumping‟ in Korea over the period 2001-2003 (p.167), 92 
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while, for the case  of  Italy,  D‟Amato  et  al.  (2018)  conclude  that „the hypothesis 93 
that stricter environmental  policy  tends  to  favor  the  emergence  of  illegal  94 
disposal  cannot  be rejected‟. Similarly,  Allers and  Hoeben  (2010),  in their study 95 
of  „unit-based  garbage pricing‟ (UBP) across Dutch municipalities over a ten-year 96 
period, found „that only about 18% of the reduction in unsorted waste quantities is 97 
due to better recycling‟(p.424). While the authors acknowledge that part of the 98 
remainder „missing waste „percentage may be attributed to illegal dumping, they 99 
nevertheless note that „if this was a serious problem, one would expect many 100 
municipalities to abolish user fees. This has not happened. Thus, there is no evidence 101 
of municipalities becoming disappointed about the effects of UBP programs‟ (ibid.). 102 
 103 
2.2. Illegal dumping and citizens’ social control 104 
Although its actual magnitude cannot be precisely determined, the rise of 105 
illegal dumping following the introduction of a PAYT scheme is an adverse reality 106 
which local authorities will have to address. In the face of budget constraints and 107 
personnel limitations, authorities have an incentive to promote individual citizens‟ 108 
action in confronting/reporting trespassers. Available research has 109 
shown that public environmental monitoring may enhance regulatory efficiency, 110 
under certain conditions (cf. Goeschl and Jürgens, 2012). Particularly to waste 111 
dumping, Matsumoto and Takeuchi (2011) found that local residents‟ „community 112 
support‟ (i.e. the existence of a system through which citizens assist the authorities‟ 113 
monitoring and patrol programs) (p.187) is related to fewer (and to a lesser growth of) 114 
illegal dumping incidents of electric appliances. 115 
When citizens witness uncivil/unlawful behaviors by others their reactions 116 
could vary over a spectrum, ranging from doing nothing -at the one end- to reporting 117 
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the perpetrator to the relevant authorities -to the other end-, with any other of the 118 
intermediate reactions being a form of „social control‟. By the term „social control‟ is 119 
meant „any behavior whereby an individual communicates his or hers disapproval to 120 
someone who holds a counternormative attitude or engages in counternormative 121 
behavior‟ (Brauer and Chekroun, 2005a, p. 1519). This willingness to engage in 122 
social-norm enforcement (also referred to by some as „altruistic punishment‟) is rather 123 
surprising since it „is individually costly, e.g. because it requires time and effort to 124 
enact, and the punisher bears the risk of retaliation when confronting a non-125 
cooperator‟ (Balafoutas et al., 2014, p. 15924). Nevertheless, it is quite common in a 126 
variety of social norms‟ violations, including littering. Thus, Brauer and Chekroun 127 
(2005a) found that 68% of respondents would exercise some kind of „social control‟ 128 
(e.g giving an angry look to personally insulting n someone littering in a French park 129 
(p.1530)), while 40% actually did so in a parallel, natural (i.e. real-life) experimental 130 
design (p.1529). Similar substantial percentages of social control (averaging around 131 
32% yet ranging substantially across cities) are reported by Berger and Hevenstone 132 
(2016) for the case of littering just outside a public trash-bin in natural experiments 133 
conducted in Bern and Zurich, Switzerland, and New York, USA (pp.307-308) -in 134 
stark contrast to Athens, Greece, where littering in the corridors leading to the 135 
platforms one of the city‟s train subway station was sanctioned by bystanders in only 136 
4% of the cases (Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012, p. 1775). 137 
  138 
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2.3. The determinants of social control 139 
Why are some individuals „willing to punish defectors [of social norms] at a 140 
cost to themselves, even though it would be advantageous [to themselves] to simply 141 
ignore them‟ (Guala, 2012, p. 1)? Available research on the predictors of social 142 
control has developed along two distinct pathways. Thus, on the one hand, it has been 143 
argued that social control follows from an individual‟s subjective appraisal of the 144 
behavior -the latter being contingent to a number of factors: the offender‟s physical 145 
characteristics-such as his/hers gender or posture (Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012; 146 
Balafoutas et al.,2014; Przepiorka and Berger, 2016); the number of other bystanders 147 
witnessing the transgression (Chekroun, 2008; Przepiorka and Berger, 2016); the 148 
particularities of the area where the offence occurred (Berger and Hevenstone, 2016); 149 
the feelings the particular anti-social behavior elicits in the observer and whether the 150 
offender is considered as “one of us” or s/he is closely related to the observer ((Berger 151 
and Hevenstone, 2016; Chekroun, 2008; Moisuc and Brauer, 2019; Nugier et al., 152 
2009); the level of ambiguity surrounding the behavior and the extent to which the 153 
observer feels it is legitimate to exercise „social control‟ over the particular behavior 154 
(Chaurand and Brauer, 2008a). Amidst the plethora of these explanatory variables, 155 
two have constituted the baseline for this particular analytical tradition, and they have 156 
been shown to be positively correlated with social control: „the degree of personal 157 
implication‟ (i.e.to which extent the individual feels that the observed behavior has 158 
implications to himself/herself) and the „degree of deviance‟ of the behavior/action 159 
(i.e. the extent to which it runs counter to societal “norms” of acceptable/desirable 160 
behavior in a social unit) (Brauer and Chekroun, 2005a; Chaurand and Brauer, 161 
2008a), although the latter was not found to be statistically significant in a natural (i.e. 162 
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real-life) experiment‟s setting (e.g. Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012; Brauer and 163 
Chekroun, 2005b). 164 
The alternative perspective focuses instead on the individual‟s social 165 
characteristics and in particular to his/her social capital. „Social capital‟ (SC) is a 166 
composite concept, comprised of the social norms one adheres to, the social trust one 167 
has to other members of the society and the social networks one partakes in 168 
(Coleman,1988), and has been widely employed as an explanatory factor in many 169 
areas of environmental policies and behaviors (Dietz et al., 2007; Jones and Clark, 170 
2014; Pretty,2003) including waste management (Jones et al., 2011; Pargal et al., 171 
2002; Tsai, 2008).Ιn the words of Coleman (1988, p. S98) „Social capital is defined 172 
by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two 173 
elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they 174 
facilitate certain actions of actors-whether persons or corporate actors-within the 175 
structure. [..It..] is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in 176 
its absence would not be possible‟. Ostrom (1998) has highlighted that communities 177 
with higher levels of social capital –dense horizontal networks and higher levels of 178 
trust- tend to act in a collective way facilitating the management of natural resources 179 
(Pretty, 2003). Through the number and type of networks (pro-environmental or not) 180 
that an individual is involved, the level of trust towards other citizens and institutions 181 
and the type of social norms according to which an individual acts, social capital can 182 
influence the level of public acceptability for waste management policies and the 183 
existence (or not) of social control (Jones et al., 2011). 184 
As it follows from a long-standing and substantial body of research on the 185 
predictors  of  crime-levels  at  the  neighborhood  level  (Bursik,  1988;  Bursik,  186 
1999;Sampson and Groves, 1989; Rose and Clear, 1998), social capital (especially its 187 
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„social networks‟ and „social trust‟ components) play an important role in actual crime 188 
prevention and control because it is positively correlated to „informal social control‟, 189 
i.e. „the informal mechanisms by which residents themselves achieve public order 190 
[…such as…] monitoring of spontaneous play groups among children, a willingness 191 
to intervene to prevent acts such as truancy and street-corner “hanging” by teenage 192 
peer groups, and the confrontation of persons who are exploiting or disturbing public 193 
space‟(Sampson et al., 1997, p. 918). In the words of Sampson et al. (1997), „At the 194 
neighborhood level [..] the willingness of local residents to intervene for the common 195 
good depends in large part on conditions of mutual trust and solidarity among 196 
neighbors. Indeed, one is unlikely to intervene in a neighborhood context in which the 197 
rules are unclear and people mistrust or fear one another‟ (p. 919)- and this positive 198 
correlation between SC and informal social control has been empirically validated in a 199 
number of studies (Sampson et al., 1999; Sampson et al., 1997). 200 
Accordingly, in this paper we are interested in testing and addressing the 201 
following research hypotheses and questions respectively: 202 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Τhe degree of personal implication (i.e. to which extent the 203 
individual feels that an observed behavior has implications to himself/herself) will 204 
impact positively on the willingness to exercise social control when witnessing illegal 205 
waste dumping. 206 
H1b: The „degree of deviance of the counter-normative behavior‟ (i.e. the extent to 207 
which the observed behavior runs counter to societal “norms” of acceptable/desirable 208 
behavior in a social unit) will impact positively on the willingness to exercise social 209 
control when witnessing waste dumping 210 
Η2: An individual‟s social capital will impact positively on the willingness to 211 




Research Question 1 (RQ1): Do an individual‟s subjective evaluation of waste 214 
dumping and his/her social capital have independent effects on his/her willingness to 215 
exercise social control? 216 
RQ2: Do the various social capital components have a similar impact on one‟s 217 
willingness to exercise social control in cases of waste dumping? 218 
 219 
3. DATA & METHODS 220 
3.1. Context and Sampling 221 
In early summer 2016 we conducted research concerning the Greek public‟s 222 
views on PAYT schemes. The research was based on an online questionnaire asking 223 
participants   to   express,   under   conditions   of   anonymity,   their   views   about  224 
the introduction  of  a  PAYT  scheme  in  their  area  of  living.  On the first page of 225 
the questionnaire, the readers were given information regarding the current situation 226 
of waste management and charges in Greece and were asked to suppose that a PAY 227 
scheme would be implemented in their area of living by their municipality. It was 228 
mentioned that the new system relied on the “Polluter Pays Principle”, and thus waste 229 
charges would be proportionate to the amount of waste produced. Furthermore, the 230 
participants were informed that the unit-pricing program would be applied 231 
simultaneously to residue waste and recyclables (the latter already collected through 232 
the „Blue Bin‟ system, where individuals may drop their recyclable waste of glass, 233 
paper, plastic, aluminum and tinplate without the need to separate them and without 234 
being offered any explicit and immediate reward). Users of the PAYT scheme would 235 
be charged 0,05€/kg of residue/recyclable waste (i.e. an amount reflecting the 236 
prescribed municipal waste management costs per kilogram at the time, under Article 237 
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43 of Law4042/12 (FEK 24/A/13-2-2012)). It was further mentioned that any 238 
inappropriately placed/disposed waste would not be collected by the cleaning 239 
workers. One of the sections of this broader questionnaire included items relating to 240 
the respondent‟s likely reaction if witnessing a case of waste dumping (i.e. 241 
purposefully bypassing the PAYT scheme). 242 
The questionnaire was communicated electronically through the University of 243 
the Aegean, Greece, academic email database and official Facebook page as well as to 244 
the acquaintances‟ network of the authors, while the recipients/readers were 245 
encouraged to forward the questionnaire to their own network of contacts. The survey 246 
remained online between May 30th and June 29th 2016, and a total of 299 responses 247 
were collected. 248 
 249 
3.2. Variables used 250 
Dependent variable 251 
„Exercising social control‟: Measured through the following question: „Assume 252 
that your municipality is implementing a Pay-As-You-Throw (PAYT) scheme for 253 
household waste and you witness another citizen bypassing it (e.g. leaving the 254 
garbage outside the ‘smart bin’ or outside the communal bin of his/hers block of flats 255 
or not using the pre-paid waste bags). Will you do any of the following? [Answer:] I 256 
will reprimand him/heron the spot for his/her behavior‟. The original responses were 257 
measured on a 4-pointLikert-scale (ranging from „1: Surely No‟ to „4: Surely Yes‟, 258 
plus the „666: I don‟t know‟ option). For our analysis, the responses „don‟t know‟ 259 
were treated as missing while the remaining 273 responses (91.3% of the original) 260 
were recoded into a dichotomous dummy variable, „1: Surely/Rather NO‟ and „2: 261 




Predictor variables 264 
„Degree of Personal Implication‟ (IMPLICATION): We measure this through 265 
the personal endorsement of any out of three PAYT schemes, which previous research 266 
identified as most suitable for implementing under existing conditions in Greek 267 
communities: (a) the volume-based bag program (Ecological Recycling Society, 268 
2011;Karagiannidis et al., 2008; Malamakis et al., 2009); (b) the punch card weight-269 
based system (Ecological Recycling Society, 2011; Jones et al., 2010; Karkanias et 270 
al., 2015);and, (c) weight-based bin per residence scheme (Ecological Recycling 271 
Society, 2011;Karagiannidis et al., 2008; Malamakis et al., 2009). In particular, 272 
respondents were asked to indicate their level of endorsement through the 5-point 273 
Likert-scale question reading „Would you be against or in favor of introducing any of 274 
these three PAYT schemes in your area of residence?‟ („1: Against‟ to „5: In favor‟). 275 
In previous research the degree of personal implication has been measured 276 
through a question reading „To what extent would you suffer, personally, the 277 
consequences of the action of this person?‟ (E.g. Brauer and Chekroun, 2005b; 278 
Chaurand and Brauer, 2008b), yet this exact question was not part of the 279 
questionnaire we used during that data gathering. As a plausible proxy, we assume 280 
that the stronger the endorsement of a PAYT system the more negative the 281 
consequences felt by an individual would be s/he witnesses this system being free-282 
ridden: since an individual endorsing a PAYT system is, ceteris paribus, in effect 283 
agreeing to pay his/her monetary „fair share‟ for waste disposal management, s/he is 284 
quite likely to consider the free-riding of the system as a, direct and personal, negative 285 
(economic to say the least) consequence. Furthermore, our analyses (available upon 286 
request) show that the endorsement of any of the proposed PAYT schemes by our 287 
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respondents is strongly and negatively correlated with the „personal costs‟ one 288 
perceives in the system („It will be more time consuming for me; …will be more 289 
difficult to use for me; and, …will be more costly to operate‟). In other words, the 290 
endorsement of a PAYT scheme is strongly related to individual self-interest, the 291 
same concept that „personal implication‟ is also supposed to measure (see Brauer and 292 
Chekroun, 2005b, p. 1523). Thus, while acknowledging the variable we use is sub-293 
optimal, we nevertheless consider the degree of personal endorsement to be an 294 
appropriate proxy for measuring an individual‟s „degree of personal implication‟. 295 
„Degree of deviance of the behavior‟ (DEVIANCE): A three-item scale 296 
(Cronbach‟s α =0.806) based on the following three questions: „To which extent do 297 
you agree with each of the following statements as a way of dealing with citizens by-298 
passing/non-complying with your Municipality‟s Pay-As-You-Throw scheme (e.g. 299 
leaving their garbage outside the PAYT bin; or, disposing household garbage in 300 
public trash-bins; or, burning their garbage, etc.): the local authorities should make 301 
public the names of those bypassing the PAYT scheme; the local authorities should 302 
impose heavy monetary fines on those bypassing the PAYT scheme; and, citizens 303 
should report to the relevant authorities (e.g. the local authorities or the police) those 304 
bypassing the PAYT scheme‟ (each question measured on a 5-point Likert scale, („1: 305 
Strongly Disagree‟, „5: Strongly Agree‟).Again, our approach differs from previous 306 
research which has tapped on the degree of deviance in a straightforward way (e.g. 307 
asking individuals to indicate „To what extent do you consider the [particular] 308 
behavior to be counter the norms of our society?‟ (Brauer and Chekroun, 2005b) or 309 
„To what extent is the [particular] behavior of this person counternormative?‟ 310 
(Chaurand and Brauer, 2008b). Obviously, ours is an even  stronger indicator of the 311 
behavior‟s perceived deviance, since the individual is asked to indicate whether s/he 312 
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feels that the particular transgression is important enough to be reported to-and/or 313 
punished by- the appropriate authorities. 314 
Social Capital (SC) is a multi-dimensional concept and was measured in our 315 
study by combining different indicators proposed in the literature (e.g. Grootaert and 316 
Bastelaer, 2002; Putnam, 2000). The most important indicator of social capital, trust, 317 
was divided in two different categories, „social (or interpersonal) trust‟ (Villalonga-318 
Olives and Kawachi, 2015) and „institutional trust‟ (Harring, 2018). 319 
Institutional Trust (INSTΙΤ TRUST) was measured through a three-item scale 320 
(Cronbach‟s α = 0.729) based on the following questions: „How much do you trust the 321 
following institutions: the national government; the Ministry for the Environment; 322 
and, your local government‟ (each question measured on a 5-point Likert scale, „1 = 323 
Not at all‟ to „5 = Fully‟). Social Trust (SOCΙAL TRUST) was measured through a 324 
three-item scale (Cronbach‟s α = 0.658) based on the following questions: 325 
„Concerning the following groups of people, do you think you should rather be 326 
cautious or you could trust them? neighbors; family; and, friends‟ (each question 327 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale, „1 = Cautious‟ to „5 = Trustful‟). 328 
Informal Social Networks (INFORMAL NETS) were captured through a two-329 
item scale (Cronbach‟s a = 0.258) based on the following questions: „How often do 330 
you do any of the following: meeting with relatives; and, meeting with friends‟ (each 331 
question measured on a 5-point Likert scale, „1: Never‟ to „5: Daily‟). 332 
Formal Social Networks (FORMAL NETS) were assessed through a two-item 333 
scale (Cronbach‟s α = 0.695) based on the following questions: „Over the past 12 334 
months have you been a member or have you volunteered to any club or society (e.g. 335 
sports/cultural/professional/environmental/political etc.)? („1 = Yes‟, „2 = No‟, for 336 
either being a member or volunteering‟). 337 
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In order to capture the level of Public Participation (PARTICIPATION) a 338 
four-item scale was applied (Cronbach‟s α = 0.619) based on the following questions: 339 
„Over the past 12 months have you done any of the following? worked for a political 340 
party or any other group/society; signed a petition; participated in a demonstration; 341 
and, boycotted or bought certain products for political, ethical and/or environmental 342 
reasons‟ („1 =Yes‟, „2 = No‟). 343 
Finally Social Norms (NORMS) were measured via a two-items scale 344 
(Cronbach‟s α =0.797) based on the following questions: „How justifiable do you 345 
consider the following actions: disposing waste outside the assigned bin; and, 346 
disposing non-recyclable waste inside the recyclables’ bin‟ (each question measured 347 
on a 5-point Likert scale, „1: Totally justifiable to „5: Totally unjustifiable‟). 348 
The correlations between the different predictor variables are presented in 349 
Table X1 in the Appendix. 350 
 351 
Control variables 352 
We also include a number of demographic variables as controls, such as the 353 
respondent‟s  gender  (dichotomous  variable),  age  (continuous  variable),  354 
educational attainment (categorical variable with 3 levels: “low- elementary 355 
schooling”, “middle -high school”, “higher- (post)graduate degrees”) and income 356 
(categorical variable with 3levels: “low, <800 euros”, “middle, 801-1600 euros”, and 357 
“higher, >1600 euros”) (The reader is referred to Table X2 in the Appendix for the 358 
descriptive statistics of the demographic variables). Available research on exercising 359 
social control has not given particular emphasis on the possible effects of 360 
demographic variables, while the few existing results have been mixed. With respect 361 
to gender, Berger and Hevenstone (2016)and Przepiorka and  Berger (2016)  found no 362 
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statistically significant differences,  contra Balafoutas  and  Nikiforakis  (2012) who 363 
found that  males  are more likely to engage in social control. Regarding age, we are 364 
aware of a single study which found that older individuals are more likely to engage 365 
in social control (Berger and Hevenstone, 2016) while we have not been able to 366 
identify any studies examining the possible effect of an individual‟s income and/or 367 
educational attainment. 368 
 369 
3.3. Methods 370 
We test the predictor variables‟ effect on an individual‟s willingness to 371 
exercise social control through binary logistic regression modeling approach (Agresti, 372 
2002). We fit the logistic models in three consecutive steps. In order to assess the 373 
model fit, we employ a model-comparison approach starting by fitting a generic null 374 
model (control model A) and then proceed by adding new sets of predictor variables 375 
for each subsequent model (Models B, C) in order to perform the models‟ 376 
comparisons. Model comparison is performed via the X
2
 statistic, which is a measure 377 
of how well the independent variables affect the outcome of the dependent variable 378 
(Hosmer et al., 2013). To obtain the results, the IBM SPSS programme 21 (Released 379 
IBM Corp., 2012) has been utilized. More analytically, in Model A, which serves as 380 
the control model, we examine solely the explanatory power of the demographic 381 
variables. In the subsequent Model B, we further incorporate the predictors pertaining 382 
to the individual‟s subjective evaluation of the (counter-normative) behavior, the 383 
„degree of personal implication‟ and the „degree of perceived deviance‟. As a final 384 
step, we examine the role of an individual‟s social capital, through its constituent 385 




4. RESULTS 388 
An impressive 89.3% of our respondents answered that they would 389 
„Surely/Rather‟ reprimand on the spot someone bypassing the PAYT scheme. As it 390 
follows from Model A (Table 1), an individual‟s demographic characteristics do not 391 
influence his/hers likelihood to exercise social control, with the exception of the 392 
Income variable: middle income individuals are over five times more likely (Odds 393 
ratio (i.e. exp(B)) = 5.129, p = 0.023 <0.05) than high-income individuals (the 394 
reference category) to exercise social control. On the contrary, there exist no 395 
statistically significant differences between low income individuals and middle or 396 
high-income ones, respectively. 397 
The inclusion of the predictors pertaining to the perceived personal 398 
implication and deviance of the PAYT bypassing (Model B), leads to an improvement 399 
of the model fit (Nagelkerke R
2
 increasing from 0.070 to 0.112 between Models A & 400 




 = 10.166; p-401 
value = 0.017<0.05). Again, we find that (only) middle income individuals are five 402 
times more likely to exercise social control (Odds ratio (i.e exp(B)) = 5.039, p = 0.026 403 
<0.05). While the perceived personal implication effect turned out to be statistically 404 
non-significant, those who perceive bypassing the PAYT scheme as “deviant” are 405 
over 1.6 more likely to reprimand someone bypassing the PAYT scheme (Odds ratio 406 
= exp(B)=1.656, p=0.049< 0.05). 407 
Coming to the final Model C, which incorporates the Social Capital (SC) 408 
component predictors, we find a further (and statistically significant) improvement of 409 
the model fit (Nagelkerke R
2
 = 0.194; X
2
 = 17.927; p-value = 0.001<0.05). Again, we 410 
observe the positive effects of middle-income (Odds ratio (i.e. exp(B)) = 5.443, 411 
p=0.025<0.05) and of the perceived deviance of the behavior (Odds ratio (i.e. exp(B)) 412 
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= 1.811,p = 0.035 <0.05) on social control. Of the added SC predictors, the only one 413 
which turned out to be statistically relevant was the „Participation‟ one: an individual 414 
who has been socially active in the past year, is more likely to confront a PAYT 415 
offender (Odds ratio (i.e. exp(B)) = 0.447, p = 0.011 < 0.05). 416 
 417 
Table 1: Predictors‟ effects on an individual‟s likelihood to exercise social control 
when witnessing PAYT bypassing (binary logistic regression results) 
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n.s.: Not statistically significant, p >0.1; *: statistically significant at the 0.1 level; **: 418 
… at the 0.05 level; ***: … at the 0.01 level 419 
 420 
5. CONCLUSIONS & DISCUSSION 421 
In this paper we set to compare two different theorizations concerning who is 422 
likely to exercise social control in the case of illegal dumping in the context of a 423 
(hypothetical) Pay-As-You-Throw (PAYT) waste management scheme. One line of 424 
argument has suggested that this would be influenced by the observer‟s subjective 425 
evaluation of the behavior, and in particular the extent that s/he feels personally 426 
affected by the behavior („degree of personal implication‟) and the extent s/he 427 
considers that behavior as inappropriate („degree of deviance‟). The other line focuses 428 
instead on the observer‟s social characteristics, in particular his/her social capital. 429 
Although both approaches have been used in previous research, we are unaware of 430 
any study which tried to juxtapose these two approaches, thus this research attempted 431 
to address a lacuna in our theoretical understanding of the determinants of social 432 
control. 433 
Our results show that both sets of predictors impact the likelihood to exercise 434 
social control, independently of one another and over the individual‟s demographic 435 
characteristics. In particular, we found that, as anticipated by previous research, the 436 
perceived degree of deviance of the observed behavior is positively related to 437 
exercising social control. Individuals who think that transgressing the PAYT scheme 438 
is an offence serious enough to be reported to -and/or punished by- the appropriate 439 
authorities are 1.8 times more likely to engage in social control than those who do not 440 
think of it as an offence worth reporting/punishing.  On the contrary, we did not find a 441 
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statistically significant relation between the „degree of personal implication‟ and 442 
social control. This result, which runs counter to past research, should rather be 443 
attributed to our operationalization of the relevant concept. As we mentioned earlier, 444 
past research measured the „degree of implication‟ by asking respondents to indicate 445 
to what extent they would suffer, personally, the consequences of the particular 446 
action/behavior. In this research, and since we lacked such an explicitly formatted 447 
question, we attempted to tap into „personal implication‟ by using one‟s endorsement 448 
of the PAYT scheme, arguing that, the stronger the endorsement of a PAYT system 449 
the more negative the consequences felt by an individual would be if this system is 450 
free-ridden.   451 
Our finding that that general endorsement of a PAYT scheme does not directly 452 
influence the willingness to confront an offender, should inform future research to the 453 
importance of measuring explicitly the extent to which one feels personally affected 454 
by the offence.  Arguably, using the endorsement of any PAYT scheme as a proxy, is 455 
a broad brush approach which does not take into account the individual‟s preferences 456 
for a particular scheme -or even for the PAYT framework itself-, which are likely to 457 
influence his/her degree of implication. Thus, further research is needed for 458 
establishing the actual strength (or the very existence) of the relation between the 459 
concepts of „endorsement‟ and „implication‟ which –as our results suggest- are not 460 
highly correlated. 461 
Coming to the possible effects of Social Capital (SC) on social control, we 462 
find that it also plays a role, over and independently of an individual‟s subjective 463 
evaluation of the observed behavior. This is corroborated on one hand by the fact that 464 
the final Model C (i.e. the one in which we have included SC predictors) fits better to, 465 
and explains more of, the data; on the other hand, by the fact that the addition of the 466 
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SC predictors does not alter either the sign or the statistical significance of the effect 467 
of any of the other predictors (the subjective evaluative ones included).  Yet not all   468 
SC components were found to be relevant. Only public „Participation‟ proved 469 
statistically significant, with more „active‟ individuals being over two times more 470 
likely to engage in social control than less „active‟ ones. On the contrary, social trust 471 
and informal networks, which were found to be particularly prominent in other studies 472 
on social control (e.g. Sampson, et al., 1999; Sampson et al., 1997), turned out to be 473 
non-significant in our study. We claim that this discrepancy is due to the fact that this 474 
prior research had largely focused on a radically different kind of delinquent behavior, 475 
namely (violent/petty) crime. Since, as Coleman (1988, p.S98) notes „Social 476 
capital…is not a single entity but a variety of different entities […thus it…] is not 477 
completely fungible but may be specific to certain activities. A given form of social 478 
capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful 479 
for others‟, the fact that certain SC components which were found to be relevant in the 480 
social control of crime turned out to be non-relevant for the case of the social control 481 
on illegal dumping should not come as a surprise. Furthermore, it should not make us 482 
lose sight of the really important theoretical finding of our research: (aspects of) 483 
social capital are a complementary predictor of social control in the case of waste 484 
dumping, independent of the subjective evaluation of the deviant behavior. 485 
Turning to the limitations of our study, the fact that our sample was self-486 
selected, may have introduced a selection bias, with persons more concerned about 487 
PAYT choosing to participate and thus being over-represented in the research. 488 
Furthermore, our average respondent (female, under 40 years old, highly educated) is 489 
not representative of the general population. These characteristics would have 490 
restricted the variability of the responses and thus resulted to weakened correlations. 491 
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Nevertheless, our analyses returned overall statistically significant relationships 492 
between the variables as well as congruent with both the available literature and 493 
previous, random-sample research. Thus, while acknowledging that the limitations 494 
posed by our sample‟s characteristics should serve as a note of caution when 495 
interpreting our findings, it is not very likely that the sample‟s composition 496 
substantially affected the results obtained. Future research, using random sampling, 497 
would allow us to settle this point.  498 
A second point of concern relates to what extent our results, based on 499 
someone‟s professed willingness to exercise social control over PAYT violations, 500 
would hold „in the real world‟. Past research has established that those actually 501 
exercising social control are far fewer than those stating they would (e.g. Brauer and 502 
Chekroun (2005a). This is hardly surprising if one considers the multitude of factors 503 
affecting such a real-life decision (see the relevant discussion in the preceding section 504 
titled „The determinants of social control‟). Nevertheless, previous research has also 505 
established that both professed and actual behaviors are affected by the same 506 
predictors overall. Thus, although we expect that far fewer Greeks would actually 507 
exercise social control than the 89% who claimed they would do so, we also anticipate 508 
that the predictors we identified in this research would be relevant in cases of actual 509 
social control as well.   510 
As a final note, we would like to comment on the policy implications of our 511 
findings. As mentioned in the Literature review, citizens‟ exercising social control in 512 
cases of PAYT bypassing may offer the waste authorities/managers a complementary 513 
(and low-cost) way of dealing with offenders. Should local officials wish to promote 514 
such a role for their citizens, our results suggest a promising way of intervening: since 515 
no external interferences may alter one‟s (personal) social capital, waste managers 516 
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should instead focus on highlighting the perceived deviance of PAYT bypassing. 517 
Promoting, through informational and advertising campaigns, the particular 518 
behavior‟s perception as an offence which should be reported to -and fined by- the 519 
authorities and whose perpetrators merit a public reprimand, is likely to enhance the   520 
citizen‟s willingness to confront the offenders. And if the latter is indeed materialized, 521 
then both the costs of formal monitoring and the incidents of free-riding the local 522 





Table X2: Descriptive statistics of demographic variables used in the analyses 
 Mean (std. dev.) Minimum/Maximum N 
Gender 
1: Female 




2: Gymnasium/High school 
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